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Abstract—The secrecy capacity based on the assumption of
having continuous distributions for the input signals constitutes
one of the fundamental metrics for the existing physical layer
security (PHYS) solutions. However, the input signals of real-
world communication systems obey discrete distributions. Fur-
thermore, apart from the capacity, another ultimate performance
metric of a communication system is its symbol error ratio
(SER). In this paper, we pursue a radically new approach to
PHYS by considering rigorous direct SER optimization exploiting
the discrete nature of practical modulated signals. Specifically,
we propose a secure precoding technique based on a multi-
objective SER criterion, which aims for minimizing the confi-
dential messages’ SER at their legitimate user, while maximizing
the SER of the confidential messages leaked to the illegitimate
user. The key to this challenging multi-objective optimization
problem is to introduce a priority factor that controls the priority
of directly minimizing the SER of the legitimate user against
directly maximizing the SER of the leaked confidential messages.
Furthermore, we define a new metric termed as the security-level,
which is related to the conditional symbol error probability of the
confidential messages leaked to the illegitimate user. Additionally,
we also introduce the secure discrete-input continuous-output
memoryless channel (DCMC) capacity referred to as secure-
DCMC-capacity, which serves as a classical security metric of
the confidential messages, given a specific discrete modulation
scheme. The impacts of both the channel’s Rician factor and
the correlation factor of antennas on the security-level and the
secure-DCMC-capacity are investigated. Our simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed priority-aware secure precoding
based on the direct SER metric is capable of securing transmis-
sions, even in the challenging scenario, where the eavesdropper
has three receive antennas, while the legitimate user only has a
single one.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, wiretap channel, secrecy
capacity, secure precoding, mean square error, symbol error rate,
conditional error probability, multiple-input multiple-output
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications suffer from the risk of eaves-
dropping due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels.
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Recently, the concept of physical layer security (PHYS) [1]–
[3] has attracted growing research interest from the wireless
communications community. PHYS techniques are capable of
securing the transmission by exploiting the physical character-
istics of wireless channels, rather than relying on higher-layer
encryption [4]. Wyner [2] proved that confidential messages
can be securely transmitted to their destination in the presence
of a wiretapper, whilst relying on the notion of secrecy capac-
ity defined by Shannon [1]. Since then, the concept of secrecy
capacity has become a fundamental metric in developing and
investigating PHYS solutions [5]–[19].
Specifically, Csiszár and Korner [14] investigated the PHYS
in a non-degraded channel, while the authors of [15] developed
this concept further in the context of Gaussian channels.
Moreover, PHYS was widely investigated in fading single-
antenna channels [16] and multiple-antenna channels [7]. Se-
cure multiple-antenna techniques have also been conceived for
maximizing the achievable secrecy rates by designing transmit
precoding (TPC) schemes [9], [12]. In particular, Khisti and
Wornell [7] provided a metric of secrecy capacity for the
Gaussian multi-antenna wiretap channel model to guide the
design of a generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-
based TPC design by maximizing the achievable throughput.
However, a fraction of the secret messages may still be leaked
to the eavesdropper, if the number of transmit antennas (TAs)
is insufficiently large. Reboredo et al. [17] designed a linear
zero-forcing (ZF) filter that minimizes the mean-squared error
(MSE) between the legitimate users, whilst ensuring that the
eavesdropper’s MSE remains above a certain threshold. A
similar beamforming scheme was developed for the multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel [18] for max-
imizing the signal-to-leakage-plus-noise ratio (SLNR). Both
the beamforming schemes developed in [17] and [18] rely on
ZF precoding for cancelling the gain of the wiretap channels
by imposing the orthogonal constraint between the wiretap
channels and the beamforming matrix. The eavesdropper often
invests more resources for eavesdropping on the confidential
message delivered to the legitimate destination. Therefore, the
scenario considered in [19], where the transmitter has multiple
TAs, the destination has a single receive antenna (RA), and
the eavesdropper has multiple RAs, is indeed realistic. Wang
et al. [18] demonstrated that the ZF-based TPC attains a
higher secrecy capacity than the GSVD-based TPC when the
total combined number of RAs of the destination and of the
eavesdropper is lower than that of the TAs.
At this point, it is worth revisiting the classical PHYS
scenario, where the system is transmitting confidential mes-
sages to a legitimate user, while an eavesdropper attempts to
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intercept these confidential messages. In recent years, non-
orthogonal transmission techniques have attracted substantial
attention [20], [21], for example for connecting a huge number
of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. More specifically, in a
non-orthogonal broadcast scenario, a group of legitimate users
share the same resources. Consequently, every user can also
receive the transmissions destined for the other users of the
group. A ‘law-abiding’ user should only decode the confiden-
tial messages designated to it. But since a user ‘legitimately’
receives all the confidential messages destined for the other
users, it may also intentionally or unintentionally listen to the
confidential messages destined for the other users. Hence, this
user becomes an ‘eavesdropper’. This PHYS scenario is more
general and more challenging than the classical one, which
motivates our current study. Although many of the conven-
tional PHYS designs discussed previously may indeed also
be applied, it is paramount to strike a compelling reliability
versus security trade-off in this general scenario.
The fundamental concept of secrecy capacity in
information-theory is based on the assumption that the input
signal obeys a continuous Gaussian distribution. However,
in practical digital communication systems, we use M -
phase-shift keying (M -PSK), M -pulse-amplitude modulation
(M -PAM) and M -quadrature amplitude modulation (M -
QAM). The secrecy rate of a Gaussian wiretap channel
conveying M -PAM input signals was studied in [22]. Bashar
et al. [11], [23] investigated the secrecy rates of a MIMO
system in the face of a single-eavesdropper (MIMO-SE)
and multiple-eavesdropper (MIMO-ME) for finite-alphabet
input signals. The key approach in these secrecy rate
studies is to exploit the relationship between the mutual
information (MI) and the MSE. The minimum MSE (MMSE)
criterion has indeed been widely adopted in designing various
communication systems, owing to its simplicity and analytical
tractability. Nevertheless, the ultimate performance metric of
a communication system is its bit error ratio (BER) or symbol
error ratio (SER). However, minimizing the MSE in general
does not lead to minimizing the BER, unless the input can be
closely approximated by a Gaussian signal [24]. Transceiver
designs based on the direct minimum BER (MBER) or direct
minimum SER (MSER) criteria were conceived for various
communication systems in [25]–[27], which demonstrate that
the MBER transmitter design and the MBER receiver design
outperform their corresponding MMSE counterparts.
The contributions of [25]–[27] however minimize the de-
sired user’s BER/SER rather than maximizing its security.
The BER metric has been adopted for analyzing the security
performance of various channel coding designs either for the
classical wiretap channel or for the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel [28]–[32]. It is worth emphasizing that
these treatises did not design channel coding PHYS solutions
by optimizing the BER metric. Rather they mainly used the
BER or BER-related metrics for analyzing channel coding
designs as PHYS solutions either for the wiretap channel
or for the AWGN channel. Similarly, the authors of [33]
designed a secure orthogonal frequency division modulation
with index modulation (OFDM-IM) system, and showed that
it outperforms the conventional OFDM-IM, in terms of its
BER. It can be seen that in the existing PHYS literature,
there is a paucity of contributions on using the BER or
SER as the design metric of secure TPC solution for MIMO
communication systems.
Against the above background, in this paper, we propose
a secure TPC solution for MIMO by directly optimizing a
multi-objective SER metric, which is capable of increasing
the reliability upon guaranteeing the secure transmission.
Specifically, our joint design objective is to minimize the SER
of the confidential messages transmitted to the designated user,
while guaranteeing secure transmission by maximizing the
SER of the confidential messages leaked to the eavesdropper.
Explicitly, our contributions are
1) We proposed a new priority-aware secure TPC based
on the multi-objective SER optimization criterion, which
aims for minimizing the SER of the confidential messages
transmitted to the designated user, while maximizing
the SER of the confidential messages leaked to the
eavesdropper, who is also a legitimate user of the system.
This multi-objective optimization based design of secure
TPC is achieved by introducing a priority factor that
controls the priorities of minimizing the SER of the
designated user against maximizing the SER of the leaked
confidential messages. A flexible tradeoff between these
two conflicting objectives is struck by adjusting this
priority factor.
2) We define a new metric termed the security-level, which
is a function of the conditional symbol error probability
(CSEP) of the leaked confidential messages. The security-
level is capable of assessing various secure TPC solu-
tions by providing a directly optimized metric of the
transmission integrity. We also introduce the novel notion
of the secure discrete-input continuous-output memory-
less channel (DCMC) capacity, secure-DCMC-capacity
for short, for capturing the nature of practical discrete-
constellation based modulated input signals. This directly
represents the maximum attainable secure and reliable
rate of the confidential messages, given a specific discrete
modulation scheme.
3) The impact of the key parameters, such as the channel’s
Rician K-factor and the correlation factor of antennas
on the security-level and the secure-DCMC-capacity are
also investigated. Moreover, we have investigated the
challenging scenario, when the eavesdropper is equipped
with three receive antennas, while the legitimate user
only has one. Our results demonstrate that the proposed
priority-aware secure TPC scheme is capable of securing
the transmission even under this hostile scenario.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the system model is presented, and the ZF-based
as well as the MMSE-based TPC are also briefly reviewed.
In Section III, the proposed secure TPC solution based on the
multi-objective SER metric is derived. Then the differential
evolutionary algorithm (DEA) used for finding the optimal
secure TPC solution based on the priority-aware SER metric
is presented. We also present a new metric, namely, the
security-level of the confidential messages in a TPC system,
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in this section. In Section IV, we define the secure-DCMC-
capacity for discrete modulated input signals, which serves as
a classical secrecy capacity metric for evaluating the proposed
solution. Our simulation results and discussions are presented
in Section V, and the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a two-receiver MIMO broadcast system. How-
ever, all the derivations and analysis in this paper can be
extended to the case of more than two receivers. The base
station (BS) employs Nt TAs to support two users, denoted
as user 1 and user 2, using a single frequency-time resource
block. User 1 and user 2 are equipped with Nr1 and Nr2
antennas, respectively. We do not impose the assumption
of Nr1 = Nr2 . This allows us to investigate challenging
PHYS precoding design problems, where the confidential
message of a vulnerable user equipped with a low number of
antennas may be eavesdropped by another more sophisticated
user, having more antennas. The total number of RAs is
Nr = Nr1 + Nr2 . The MIMO system investigated is a full-
rank one, where the number of TAs at the BS is no less than
the total number of RAs. It is well known that Nt > Nr
is required in order for a MIMO system to achieve adequate
performance when a linear precoding/detection technique is
adopted. For the rank-deficient MIMO scenario, sophisticated
nonlinear precoding/detection must be employed. For example,
the authors of [34] proposed a generalized vector precoding
to tackle this challenge in classical MIMO system without
considering PHYS. Since we investigate a linear precoding
based PHYS design, a full-rank MIMO system is considered.
Specifically, the BS transmits a pair of independent confi-
dential messages, s1 ∈ CNr1 to user 1 and s2 ∈ CNr2 to
user 2, respectively. The task of the BS is twofold. Firstly, it
has to ensure that s1 is received by user 1 and s2 is received by
user 2, reliably. Secondly, the message s1 intended for user 1
has to be kept secret from user 2, and the message s2 intended
for user 2 has to be kept secret from user 1. Given these two
conflicting objectives, the BS carries out secure precoding of
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where the TPC matrix W ∈ CNt×Nr is designed based on
the downlink CSI estimated during the pilot training phase1.
In (1), λ is a normalization factor that normalizes the average










where Es is the average power of each data stream, E[·]
denotes the expectation operator, and Tr{·} is the matrix trace
1For a time division duplexing based system, the BS acquires the uplink CSI
based on training symbols received from the uplink transmitters and exploits
the reciprocity property of the uplink and downlink channels to design the
TPC using the estimated uplink CSI. For a frequency division duplexing based
system, the BS transmits pilots for the downlink receivers to acquire their
respective CSI, which are quantized and fed back to the BS.
operator, while (·)H is the conjugate transpose operator. For
fairness, the average powers per data stream are identical to
Es for the both users.
The signals yi ∈ CNri received by the receivers, i = 1, 2,
can be expressed as
yi =Hix + εi, i = 1, 2, (3)
where Hi∈CNri×Nt denotes the MIMO channel matrix from
the BS to user i, and εi is the AWGN vector at receiver i
having the covariance matrix of 2σ2εINri . Here IN denotes
the (N×N) identity matrix. The signal to noise ratio (SNR)




∀nr ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nr}. The channel matrix Hi is explicitly









Hri , i = 1, 2, (4)
where KRice is the K-factor of the Rician channel, Hdi = e
jφi
is the deterministic component of Receiver-i’s specular path
arriving with uniformly distributed phase φi [35, p. 49], and
Hri is the scattered channel component that is the aggregation
of the large number of reflected and scattered path compo-










2 , i = 1, 2, (5)
where Rt ∈ CNt×Nt and Rri ∈ CNri×Nri are the spatial
correlation matrices for the Nt TAs of the BS and the Nri
RAs of user i, respectively, while Gi ∈ CNri×Nt has the
independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex-valued
entries, each obeying the complex Gaussian distribution of
CN (0, 1). We generate the correlation matrices Rt and Rri
according to the model of [36]. Explicitly, the l-th row and
l′-th column element of the correlation matrix R, where we















in which (·)‡ is the conjugation operation, ρejθ is the correla-
tion coefficient, ρ is the correlation factor between antennas,
and θ is the phase of the coefficient. Additionally, H1 and
H2 are uncorrelated, and both are assumed to be known to
the BS. The impact of imperfect CSI will be investigated in
our future work.
Based on the knowledge of H1 and H2, the BS designs
the TPC matrix W for striking a trade-off between the
information reliability and information secrecy by enabling
reliable transmission to the designated user, while securing the
transmission by avoiding leakage to the other user. There are
various design criteria for the TPC matrix W , including the
ZF-based TPC design [18] and the MMSE-based TPC design
[38]. The contribution of this paper is to develop a priority-
aware secure TPC design based on the multi-objective SER




















λH1[nr1 , :]W [:, nr]s(nr), (11)
III. PRIORITY-AWARE SECURE TPC BASED ON
MULTI-OBJECTIVE SER METRIC
In contrast to the traditional secure TPC solutions, which
are designed based on information theory by assuming that
the input signals are Gaussian distributed, we propose radically
different priority-aware secure TPC design based on the multi-
objective SER criterion for practical digital communication
systems with discrete modulated signals, which is capable of
balancing the priority of minimizing the SER of the confiden-
tial message to its designated user against maximizing the SER
of the confidential message eavesdropped by the eavesdropper.
Without loss of generality, we use the M -QAM modulation
scheme for characterizing our multi-objective SER-based se-
cure TPC solution. Given the total number of RAs of user 1
and user 2, Nr, there are I = MNr potential transmitted





∣∣sm,n = zm + jzn, 1 ≤ m,n ≤ √M}, (7)




= zm = 2m−
√
M−1




= zn = 2n −
√
M − 1.
Therefore, the transmitted input signal vector x takes values
from the signal set defined by
X 4=
{




The size of X is obviously I . Based on the TPC model (1) with
the normalization factor λ given by (2) as well as the channel
model (3), the received signal vectors can be expressed as
yi =
√
λHiWs + εi, i = 1, 2. (9)
When a confidential message is for user 1, user 2 may
become an eavesdropper to the message, and vice versa.
Accordingly, the CSEP of user 1 in decoding its confidential
messages defines the legitimate-user’s CSEP of user 1, while
the eavesdropper’s CSEP in decoding the confidential mes-
sages designated to user 1 defines the illegitimate-user’s CSEP
of user 2 eavesdropping on the confidential messages of user 1.
Similarly, we can define the legitimate-user’s CSEP of user 2
and the illegitimate-user’s CSEP of user 1 eavesdropping on
the confidential messages of user 2.
A. Legitimate-user conditional symbol error probability
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is given by (11),




is the nr1 -th element of s1, and s(nr) is the nr-th element of
s. The first term in the right-hand side of (11) is the desired
signal, the second term is the residual self-interference from
the other data streams of the same user, and the third term is











. Since the BS has pre-
equalized the MIMO channel by the TPC matrix W ap-
proximately, the residual self-interference and the residual
multiuser interference in (11) are much smaller than the
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For the 16-QAM modulation, i.e., for
√
M = 4, the











= zm, for 1 ≤ m ≤ 4 are illustrated in
Fig. 1 as the shaded areas. More specifically, the condi-




6= z1 is the red shaded










6= z3 is the yellow shaded area, and the conditional









, there are a total of J = M (Nr−1)
potential transmitted symbol vectors for s. Therefore, there













)∣∣s1(nr1)} ={ȳ(j)1 (nr1) = ȳ(j)R1 (nr1)+ jȳ(j)I1 (nr1),































and the TPC matrix W , therefore, the conditional probability




is a Gaussian mixture
−3 −1−2 0 1 2 3
z4z1 z2 z3






























































This should be contrast with the ideal AWGN channel, where
the CPDF is a Gaussian, i.e., the channel AWGN’s PDF. The
practical M -QAM constellation is symmetric, and
√
M is an























for 1 ≤ m ≤
√
M , satisfy the shift invariant property











= zm, for 1 ≤ m ≤
√
M , satisfy the shift
symmetric property [27]. For
√
M = 4, the shifted symmetric
property of the four CPDFs is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Referring to the decision rule (12) and the illustration of






















































Again the legitimate-user CSEP (15) should be contrast to
the one for the ideal AWGN channel which is a single Q-
function. Following the derivation in Appendix A, the average
legitimate-user CSEP of user 1 is given by
P
l(1)































In the same way, we can derive the average legitimate-user
CSEP of user 2 P l(2)E,2 (W ).
B. Illegitimate-user conditional symbol error probability
To investigate the illegitimate-user CSEP of user 2 eaves-
dropping on the confidential messages of user 1, we rewrite




at the nr2 -th RA of user 2 for









is the noise-free part containing the signal of















is the interference imposed by user 2’s




is the nr2 -th element of ε2. When





the best strategy is as follows. First, user 2 can attempt





using its own detected data. Since the
TPC matrix is designed to ensure that a user can reliably
decode its own confidential messages, the detected data of
user 2’s are correct with a very high probability. Hence this





in (19) to almost zero. Secondly, since user 2 has




for 1 + Nr1 ≤ nr2 ≤ Nr2 + Nr1 , it can attempt some form
of received combining using these Nr2 signals to mitigate the
self-interference of user 1’s data streams, i.e., to reduce the first






The worst-case security scenario is therefore as follows:
user 2 decodes its own data perfectly, thus becomes able to
perform perfect self cancellation, and it has managed to ac-
quire the TPC matrix W1 for user 1, thus it is able to perform
receive combining for its received user-1’s signal components
by all its antennas. Consequently, the BS must design the
secure TPC matrices to ensure that even under this worst-case
security scenario, the above eavesdropper strategy will fail.
The rationale of such a design approach is plausible. If the BS
can ensure that even under this worst-case security scenario,
the eavesdropper fails to decode the other user’s confidential
messages, it will certainly ensure security under all the other
situations that are less favourable for the eavesdropper, namely,
when the eavesdropper cannot perfectly cancel out its own
self-interference and/or it has no knowledge of the other user’s
TPC matrix.
Specifically, the BS can first assume that user 2 can perfectly



















Secondly, the BS also assumes that user 2 has managed to
acquire or steal W1. It is widely exploited that the maximum-
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ratio combiner (MRC) is an optimal linear combiner2 for max-
imizing the diversity gain of multiple independent channels.
Thus the BS will assume that user 2 adopts the MRC for
maximally improving its successful eavesdropping probability.






















∣∣∣√λH2[nr2 , :]W [:, nr1 ]∣∣∣2 . (21)















based on the decision rule (2).
































































∣∣∣√λH2[nr2 , :]W [:, nr1 ]∣∣∣2 , (23)
while σ̃2ε is the effective variance of the noise at the output of
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Nr2∑
nr2=1















































2Note that user 2 may also employ sophisticated non-linear receiver
combining, which may achieve a slightly better eavesdropping performance.
Nevertheless, we adopt the MRC, which allows us to derive a closed-form












As detailed in Appendix B, we can arrive at the illegitimate-
CSEP of user 2 eavesdropping on user 1’s confidential mes-

























Clearly, this illegitimate-CSEP is the lower bound that repre-
sents the best achievable SER of user 2, who is eavesdropping
on user 1’s confidential messages. In reality, the eavesdropping
user 2 will have a much higher CSEP, when it eavesdrops on
user 1’s confidential message, since in most practical cases,
user 2 does not know W1.
The lower bound of the average illegitimate-CSEP of user-1
eavesdropping on user-2’s confidential messages, P ill(2)E,1 (W ),
can be derived in the same way. Without causing misunder-
standing, we will also refer to the lower-bound illegitimate-
CSEPs P ill(1)E,2 (W ) and P
ill(2)
E,1 (W ) as the illegitimate-CSEPs.
C. The optimization problem of priority-aware secure precod-
ing
In order to secure transmissions, the BS should de-
sign W for minimizing the legitimate-CSEPs P l(1)E,1 (W )
and P l(2)E,2 (W ), while maximizing the illegitimate-CSEPs
P
ill(1)
E,2 (W ) and P
ill(2)
E,1 (W ). This is a challenging multi (two)-
objective optimization problem. Intuitively, the most secure
case when user-2 eavesdropping on the confidential message
of user-1 is that it can only randomly guess user-1’s message.
This has a SER of M−1M for the M -QAM signal. Thus, the
most secure TPC is the one that achieves P ill(1)E,2 (W ) →
M−1
M , and maximizing P
ill(1)
E,2 (W ) corresponds to minimizing∣∣P ill(1)E,2 (W ) − M−1M ∣∣. Similarly, maximizing P ill(2)E,1 (W ) is
equivalent to minimizing
∣∣P ill(2)E,1 (W )−M−1M ∣∣. Thus, the opti-
mal secure TPC solution W ? should simultaneously minimize
P
l(1)
E,1 (W ) and P
l(2)
E,2 (W ) as well as
∣∣P ill(1)E,2 (W ) − M−1M ∣∣
and
∣∣P ill(2)E,1 (W ) − M−1M ∣∣. Since this is a challenging two-
objective optimization problem, the optimal solution set forms
an optimal Pareto front, which may be obtained by an evo-
lutionary multi-objective algorithm [39]–[41], albeit at an
extremely high computational complexity. Moreover, in a
practical system, even when such an optimal Pareto solution
set is found, a trade-off must be struck between the information
reliability, i.e., minimizing P l(1)E,1 (W ) and P
l(2)
E,2 (W ), and
information security, namely, minimizing
∣∣P ill(1)E,2 (W )−M−1M ∣∣
and
∣∣P ill(2)E,1 (W ) − M−1M ∣∣. This corresponds to selecting a
particular point on the Pareto front to meet the required trade-













(∣∣∣∣P ill(1)E,2 (W )− M − 1M
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣P ill(2)E,1 (W )− M − 1M
∣∣∣∣) , (28)
Considering this practical perspective, therefore, we com-




∣∣P ill(1)E,2 (W ) − M−1M ∣∣ and ∣∣P ill(2)E,1 (W ) − M−1M ∣∣,
into a single objective with the priority factor ξ ∈ [0, 1],
which defines the trade-off between information reliability
and information security. More explicitly, the above challeng-
ing multi-objective optimization problem is transferred into
a single-objective optimization by introducing the following
metric termed as the weighted-CSEP for designing the optimal
TPC matrix W given in (28), where the legitimate-priority
factor ξ and illegitimate-priority factor (1 − ξ) represent the
weighting factors for the legitimate-CSEPs and illegitimate-
CSEPs, respectively. A larger value of ξ indicates a higher
priority of minimizing the legitimate-CSEPs. By contrast, a
smaller ξ or a larger value of (1−ξ) indicates a higher priority
of maximizing illegitimate-CSEPs.
The optimal priority-aware secure TPC matrix WMSER
based on the multi-objective SER criterion of (28) is defined
by the following optimization problem:




E (W ). (29)
Intuitively, WMSER is a particular solution point on the
optimal Pareto front of the solutions that reflects where our
‘priority’ is in terms of minimizing the legitimate-CSEPs and
maximizing the illegitimate-CSEPs, with the trade off between
the two conflicting optimization objectives specified by the
priority factor ξ.
D. Differential evolution algorithm aided multi-objective SER
based TPC
There is no closed-form solution for the optimal secure
TPC matrix WMSER, and a numerical optimization must be
adopted to obtain WMSER. For example, a gradient algorithm
was invoked for finding the MSER/MBER solution for the
systems without considering PHYS [27]. However, gradient-
based algorithm may become trapped at locally optimal points.
Hence, we opt for using the DEA for solving the optimization
problem (29). As an efficient global optimization algorithm,
DEA [42]–[44] is capable of finding a globally optimal solu-
tion for a wide variety of optimization scenarios with a near-
unity probability, provided that a sufficiently computational
complexity quantified in terms of the number of evolutionary
generations is affordable [46], [47]. This has been charac-
terized in [45]–[47] for wireless system designs, but without
considering their PHYS. Furthermore, both the design and the
probability of the DEA’s convergence are detailed in [45]–[47].
For the sake of completeness, below we summarize our DEA
designed for solving the optimization problem (29), which
requires optimization over continuous spaces.
1) Initialization. The DEA commences its evolution by
randomly generating an initial population of PS candidate
vectors, denoted by
ŵ1,ps=[ŵ1,ps,1ŵ1,ps,2 · · · ŵ1,ps,A]T∈CA,1≤ps≤PS , (30)
where PS is the population size, and A = Nt ·Nr. Each
ŵ1,ps represents a potential solution, and the first index
1 in ŵ1,ps indicates that this is the first generation. A
size-P elite-archive deposits the 100P% best candidate
vectors of the current population.
2) Mutation. The aim of mutation is to prevent the prema-
ture convergence to a local optimum without thoroughly
exploring the search-space. Hence, at the g-th genera-
tion, the mutation perturbs the candidate solutions by
perturbing the selected base population vector ŵg,ps with
a mutant vector, which is generated by two appropriately
scaled and randomly selected difference vectors. Explic-











where ŵeliteg,p is randomly selected from the elite-archive,
and 1 ≤ pr1 , pr2 ≤ PS are two random integer values,
which also satisfy pr1 6= pr2 , pr1 6= ps and pr2 6= ps,
while λps ∈ (0, 1] denotes the scaling factor, which is
randomly generated for each individual according to the
normal distribution with the mean µλ and the standard
deviation σλ.
3) Crossover. To avoid premature convergence and to in-
crease the diversity of the population, the crossover
operation generates a trial candidate vector by exchanging
some elements of a target vector and a donor vector.
Specifically, the a-th element of the trial vector w̆g,ps
is generated according to
w̆g,ps,a =
{
w̃1,ps,a, randa(0, 1) ≤ Cps ,
ŵg,ps,a, randa(0, 1) > Cps ,
(32)
where w̃g,ps,a and ŵg,ps,a are the a-th elements of the
donor vector w̃g,ps and the target vector ŵg,ps , respec-
tively, and the random number generator randa(0, 1) gen-
erates a uniformly distributed random value in the range
of [0, 1), while Cps denotes the crossover probability that
determines whether the a-th element of a target vector
will be replaced by its donor vector, and it obeys the
normal distribution with the mean µc and the standard
deviation σc.
4) Selection. The selection operation compares the target
vectors and the trial vectors to decide which survives into
the next generation. Explicitly, we first convert ŵg,ps and
w̆g,ps into the target and trial matrices Ŵg,ps and W̆g,ps ,
respectively. Then whether ŵg,ps or w̆g,ps survives into
the next generation is decided according to
ŵg+1,ps=

























The selection operation maintains constant population
size of PS .
5) Adaptation. The mean of the crossover probability µc









































∣∣s(m)1 (nr1),W) dỹ2(nr1), (40)
updated according to
µc =(1− κ)µc + κ ·meanA (Sc) , (34)
µλ =(1− κ)µλ + κ ·meanL (Sλ) , (35)
where the factor κ controls the rate of adaption, meanA(·)
represents the arithmetic average, and meanL(Sλ)





λps , while Sc denotes the set of
successful crossover probabilities, and Sλ is the set of
successful scaling factors in generating survived candi-
date vectors.
6) Termination. The evolution is terminated when either of
the following two criteria is met:
C1. The pre-defined maximum number of generations
Gmax for evolution has been exhausted.
C2. There is no improvement in the weighted-CSEP
value of the best candidate in the population for ∆g
generations.
E. Security-level of the confidential message
In general, a PHYS solution must balance the system’s
information reliability and information security. The secrecy
capacity, which takes into account both the information relia-
bility and information security, has been used as a fundamental
metric in developing and investigating PHYS solutions. In
practice, there is also a need to evaluate the system’s in-
formation security separately to answer the question of how
secure the confidential messages are. This motivates us to
introduce the concept of security-level. As mentioned-above,
the illegitimate-CSEPs P ill(i)E,j (W ), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, quantify
the information security of the given PYHS TPC design W .















, i, j=1, 2, i 6=j, (36)
which takes a value from 0 to 100 to represent the security-
level of user i from low to high. In particular, L(s)i (W ) = 100
indicates that there is no leakage at all of user i’s confiden-
tial messages to user-j, and they are completely secure. By
contrast, L(s)i (W ) = 0 indicates that user i’s confidential
messages are completely exposed to user-j’s eavesdropping,
since user j can correctly decode them.
The security level only considers the information security
aspect of the system. The information reliability of the system
is the other important consideration, which of course can
be quantitatively measured by the legitimate-CSEPs. In the
next section, we introduce the secure-DCMC-capacity, which
is an extension to the classical security capacity, to serve
as a security capacity metric of the confidential messages,
by considering both the DCMC-capacity for the legitimate
user’s confidential message and the DCMC-capacity for the
leakage of the legitimate user’s confidential message to the
eavesdropper.
IV. SECURE MI WITH DISCRETE INPUT SIGNALS
We now investigate the MI of confidential messages des-
tined to the legitimate-user and that leaked to the illegitimate-
user for M -QAM signals. For notational convenience, we
also number the M constellation points of S given in (7)
by m = 1, 2, · · · ,M . Since the M -QAM symbol points are
equiprobable, the probability of s1(nr1) assuming the m-th






= 1M for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
Similar to the set (13), given s1(nr1) = s
(m)
1 (nr1) and W ,
there are J possible values for the noise-free component of
y1(nr1), denoted by the set
{˜̄y(j)1 (nr1), 1 ≤ j ≤ J}. The
CPDF of y1(nr1) conditioned on s
(m)















The MI Il(1)1 (s1(nr1); y1(nr1)) then represents the DCMC ca-
pacity of the confidential message related to legitimate user 1’s
nr1 -th antenna, which can be shown to be given by (38).
Thus the sum DCMC-capacity of confidential messages to






Il(1)1 (s1(nr1); y1(nr1)) . (39)
Similarly, the MI Iill(1)2 (s1(nr1); ỹ2(nr1)) represents the
DCMC capacity of the confidential message related to user 1’s
nr1 -th antenna leaked to illegitimate user 2, which is given by
(40), where the noise-free part of ỹ2(nr1) given s
(m)
1 (nr1) and
W takes the value from the set
{˜̄y(j)2 (nr1), 1 ≤ j ≤ J}, and
the CPDF of ỹ2(nr1) given s
(m)
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(b) security-level of user 2
Fig. 2. Comparison of the security-level performance of two users for three designs, under KRice = 0 and ρ = 0.
The sum DCMC-capacity of user 1’s confidential message






Iill(1)2 (s1(nr1); ỹ2(nr1)) . (42)
Finally, we can define the secure-DCMC-capacity of








In the same way, we arrive at the secure-DCMC-capacity
of user 2’s confidential messages C(s)DCMC,2(W ).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In our investigations, the users have different numbers of
RAs, to reflect practical systems where the numbers of data
streams transmitted to the users can be different. Explicitly, we
consider a two-user non-orthogonal based broadcast system,
where the BS employs Nt = 4 TAs, user 1 has a single RA
and user 2 is equipped with 3 RAs. The 4-QAM signaling is
employed. Clearly, the security of user 1’s confidential mes-
sage faces a quite challenge, as the potential eavesdropper has
more antennas. Simulation results are provided for evaluating
the security-level, the SER of confidential messages and the
secure-DCMC-capacity for the proposed priority-aware secure
TPC based on the multi-objective SER optimization, denoted
as MSER for short, using the ZF-based TPC [18] and the
MMSE-based TPC [38] as two benchmarks. Furthermore, the
impacts of some key system parameters on the achievable
secure system performance are also investigated. The DEA
of Subsection III-D is used to solve the optimization problem
(29). The population size is set to PS = 100, and the two
stopping criteria are specified by Gmax = 500 and ∆g = 50.
A. The impact of priority factor
The Rician K-factor is set to KRice = 0, i.e., the channel is
Rayleigh distributed, and the antenna correlation is set ρ = 0.
Fig. 2 depicts the security-level performance, L(s)1 (W ) and
L
(s)
2 (W ), as the functions of the user SNR for the three secure
TPC schemes, where the impact of the priority factor ξ on the
performance of the priority-aware MSER-based secure TPC
design is also investigated. As expected, the ZF-based TPC
always attains the maximum security-level, as it completely
removes the leakage of the legitimate user’s confidential
message to the illegitimate user. By comparison, the security-
level of the MMSE-based TPC is poorer and it cannot reach
the maximum security-level even under high-SNR conditions,
since there always exists some leakage of the legitimate user’s
confidential message to the eavesdropper. With ξ = 0.5, which
means that our MSER-based TPC assigns the equal weight
to minimizing the legitimate-user CSEP and to maximizing
the illegitimate-user CSEP, it attains the maximum security-
level for user 1 for SNR ≥ 4 dB and achieves the maximum
security-level for user 2 for the whole range of SNRs tested.
With ξ = 0.9, which means that the design weighs more
heavily on information reliability than information security,
our MSER design can only attain the maximum security-level
for user 1 for SNR ≥ 13 dB, and it can only achieve the
maximum security-level for user 2, when SNR ≥ 14 dB. Not
surprisingly, with ξ = 1.0, which means that our MSER TPC
completely ignores the maximization of the illegitimate-user
CSEP, it cannot attain the maximum security-level. Also as
expected, with the exception of the ZF TPC, the achievable
security-level of user 1 is poorer than that of user 2 for the
other two TPC designs, which simply demonstrates the fact
that user 1’s confidential messages are more vulnerable to
leakage, since the eavesdropper, user 2, has more antennas.
The previous simulation results confirm that the ZF-based
TPC design attains the maximum information security with
no leakage of the legitimate user’s confidential message. The
consequence of this is that the legitimate user’s information
bits will appear to be purely random to the eavesdropper,
and regardless which eavesdropping strategy is adopted by
the eavesdropper, it can only decode the legitimate user’s
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(b) BER of user 2 eavesdropping on user 1
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(b) SER of user 2
Fig. 4. Comparison of the SER performance of confidential messages for three designs, under KRice = 0 and ρ = 0.
randomly tossing a coin. In other words, in the system based
on the ZF TPC, the BER of the eavesdropper tempering the
other user’s confidential data should be equal or very close to
0.5. Fig. 3 compares the BER performance of the eavesdropper
tempering with the other user’s confidential messages for the
three designs. Observe from Fig. 3 that the ZF-based TPC
indeed ensures that the eavesdropper has the highest BER
equal or very close to 0.5 when it decodes the legitimate user’s
confidential message. Also from Fig. 3, it can be seen that our
MSER TCP design with ξ = 0.5 imposes the second highest
BER, also very close to the maximum BER value of 0.5, on the
eavesdropper for tempering with the other user’s confidential
messages. This agrees with the results of Fig. 2.
Having examined the information security of the three de-
signs, we now turn our attention to their information reliability
performance. Fig. 4 shows the achievable SER performance,
P
l(1)
E,1 (W ) and P
l(2)
E,2 (W ), as the functions of the user SNR
for the three designs. The effective MIMO system for user 1
consists of two TAs and one RA. For this type of ‘overloaded’
systems, the MMSE design outperforms the ZF scheme in
terms of achievable SER, while our MSER design significantly
outperforms the MMSE-based scheme. This is confirmed by
the results of Fig. 4(a). For user 1, the SER performance of our
MSER-based solutions having the priority factors of ξ = 1.0
and 0.9 are better than the SER associated with ξ = 0.5. This
makes sense, since higher ξ means placing higher emphasis on
minimizing the SER of the legitimate user. Also observe from
Fig. 4(a) that the SER curves associated with ξ = 1.0 and 0.9
are very close. By contrast, the effective MIMO system for
user 2 consists of two TAs and three RAs. Since the number
of outputs is higher than the number of inputs, the signals are
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(b) Secure-DCMC-capacity of user 2


















































(b) security-level of user 2
Fig. 6. Comparison of the security-level performance of two users for three designs, under ρ = 0 and different KRice.
MMSE and MSER solutions are typically indistinguishable
[24]. This is confirmed by the results of Fig. 4(b).
The secure-DCMC-capacity, which takes into account both
the information reliability and information security, character-
izes the overall security performance. In Fig. 5, C(s)DCMC,1(W )
and C(s)DCMC,2(W ) are studied for the three designs. As ex-
pected, the results obtained confirm that the MMSE TPC
attains higher secure-DCMC-capacity than the ZF TPC for
both users. Observe from Fig. 5(a) that for user 1, our MSER
design with ξ=0.5 attains higher secure-DCMC-capacity than
the MMSE design, while the MSER TPC with ξ = 0.9 has
similar secure-DCMC-capacity to that of the MMSE TPC for
SNR≤5 dB, but the former has higher secure-DCMC-capacity
for SNR>5 dB. With ξ=1.0, C(s)DCMC,1(WMSER) is lower than
C
(s)
DCMC,1(WMMSE) for SNR<10 dB, but becomes higher than
the latter for SNR> 10 dB. Regarding user 2, it can be seen
from Fig. 4(b) that with ξ=0.9, C(s)DCMC,2(WMSER) is similar
to C(s)DCMC,2(WMMSE). With ξ = 1.0, C
(s)
DCMC,2(WMSER) is
similar to C(s)DCMC,2(WMMSE) for SNR < 10 dB but the
former is lower than the latter for SNR > 10 dB. With
ξ= 0.5, C(s)DCMC,2(WMSER) is lower than C
(s)
DCMC,2(WMMSE)
for SNR< 8 dB, but the former becomes similar to the latter
when SNR>8 dB.
By observing the results of Figs. 2 to 5, it can be seen
that for our priority-aware secure TPC design based on the
multi-objective SER optimization, the priority factor of ξ =
0.5 to 0.9 strikes beneficial trade-off between maximizing the
security-level and minimizing the SER for the legitimate user,
especially for the challenging case of user 1. Since the secure-
DCMC-capacity of our MSER-based TPC design with ξ = 0.9
are overall better for both users than those with ξ = 0.5 and
1.0, in the following investigation, we set the priority factor







































(b) SER of user 2































































(b) Secure-DCMC-capacity of user 2
Fig. 8. Comparison of the secure-DCMC-capacity performance of two users for three designs, under ρ = 0 and different KRice..
B. The impact of Rician factor
By setting the antenna correlation to ρ = 0, we investigate
the impact of Rician factor. Fig. 6 compares the security-levels
of the three designs. Similar conclusions to those for Fig. 2
can be drawn. In particular, the ZF TPC always guarantees
the maximum security-level of confidential messages. Our
MSER TPC with the priority factor of ξ = 0.9 is capable
of attaining the maximum security-level for sufficiently high
SNRs, while the MMSE TPC is unable to attain the maximum
security-level. Also for the MMSE and MSER schemes, the
achievable security-level of user 1 is poorer than that of
user 2. Additionally, for these two schemes, the security-
levels under KRice = 10 and 20 are clearly better than those
under KRice = 0. Furthermore, the KRice = 10 scenario is
marginally better than that of KRice = 20.
The impact of the Rician K-factor on the achievable SER
performance is depicted in Fig. 7 for the three solutions.
Similar to Fig. 4, it can be seen that for user 1, our MSER
design attains much better SER performance than the ZF and
MMSE solutions for a given KRice. For user 2, the three
solutions have similar SER performance for a given KRice.
Additionally, for any of the three designs and for both users,
the SER performance achieved under KRice = 10 and 20
are very close, and they are better than that attained under
KRice = 0 as expected.
The impact of KRice on the secure-DCMC-capacity perfor-
mance is investigated in Fig. 8 for the three designs. Observe
from Fig. 8(a) that for user 1, the secure-DCMC-capacity of
our MSER TPC is generally better than those of the MMSE
and ZF solutions. Also for any of the three designs, the secure-
DCMC-capacity of user 1 under KRice = 10 and 20 are very
similar, and they are better than that attained under KRice = 0.
The last observation is also true for user 2, as can be seen


























































(b) security-level of user 2






































(b) SER of user 2
Fig. 10. Comparison of the SER performance of confidential messages for three designs, under KRice = 0 and different ρ.
of the MMSE solution under KRice = 10 and 20 are better
than those of the MSER and ZF designs when SNR < 8 dB.
Under KRice = 0, which simply repeats Fig. 5(b), the MSER
and MMSE solutions for user 2 exhibit similar performance,
and they significantly outperform the ZF design.
C. The impact of correlation factor between antennas
With the Rician factor set to KRice = 0, the impact of
antenna correlation ρ on the achievable security-level for the
three TPC designs is studied in Fig. 9. As expected, the
security-level of the ZF design is not affected by ρ, since it
always attains the maximum security-level. By contrast, the
correlation factor has clear impact on the MSER-based and
MMSE-based solutions. For these two designs, lower ρ leads
to better security-level performance. Fig. 9(a) shows that for
user 1, our MSER-based TPC outperforms the MMSE-based
TPC, in terms of security level, when SNR > 9 dB, while
Fig. 9(b) shows that for user 2, our MSER-based TPC always
achieves better security-level than the MMSE-based solution.
Fig. 10 investigates the impact of ρ on the SER performance
of confidential messages for the three solutions. Generally, a
higher correlation factor results in a higher SER for confi-
dential messages. The SER performance of the ZF TPC is
particularly sensitive to ρ, which degrades dramatically as ρ
increases. This is in contrast to the security-level of the ZF
solution, which is not affected by ρ at all. It is seen from
Fig. 10(a) that for user 1, our MSER-based TPC typically
outperforms the MMSE-based TPC, while the MMSE-based
design significantly outperforms the ZF-based solution, in
terms of the SER performance. As for user 2, Fig. 10(b)
indicates that the MSER-based and MMSE-based solutions
have similar SER performance, and they outperform the ZF-
based design when antenna correlation exists.

































































(b) Secure-DCMC-capacity of user 2
Fig. 11. Comparison of the secure-DCMC-capacity of two users for three designs, under KRice = 0 and different ρ.
capacity is investigated in Fig. 11. For all the three designs,
generally increasing ρ leads to reduction in secure-DCMC-
capacity. An exception is the MSER-based TPC for user 2
under low SNR conditions, where significantly higher secure-
DCMC-capacity is achieved for higher ρ, as clearly seen from
Fig. 11(b). The results of Fig. 11 show that our MSER TPC
achieves significantly higher secure-DCMC-capacity than the
MMSE solution for the both users, while the ZF TPC has the
lowest secure-DCMC-capacity. The secure-DCMC-capacity of
the ZF solution is particularly sensitive to ρ.
D. Discussions
In our proposed priority-aware TPC-aided PHYS solution
based on the multi-objective SER optimization designed for
the generic non-orthogonal based broadcast system, we mini-
mize the SER of the confidential messages transmitted to the
legitimate user, whilst maximizing the SER of the confiden-
tial messages leaked to the eavesdropper. In the simulation-
based investigations, we compare our proposed solution to the
existing ZF-based TPC and MMSE-based TPC in terms of
three key metrics. Explicitly, we use the security-level of the
confidential messages which is an information security metric
that quantifies how secure the confidential messages are in the
presence of an eavesdropper. Secondly, we employ the SER
of the confidential messages which is an information relia-
bility metric quantifies the SER of the confidential messages
decoded by the legitimate user. Finally, the secure-DCMC-
capacity is used which is an overall security metric that takes
into account both the information reliability and information
security of the system.
The security scenario of user 1 is particularly hostile, be-
cause this single-antenna user faces the potential eavesdropper,
user 2, armed with more resource – three antennas. Therefore,
securing the transmissions to user 1 is very challenging.
Additionally, the equivalent MIMO system for user 1 is an
overloaded MIMO system consisting of two TAs and one RA.
Therefore, achieving the reliable transmissions to user 1 is also
very challenging. It is for this type of challenging scenarios
that our priority-aware design based on the multi-objective
SER criterion is particularly effective. Compared to traditional
secure TPC designs, such as the ZF-based TPC and the
MMSE-based TPC, our design is capable of striking a flexible
trade-off between minimizing the SER of the legitimate user’s
confidential messages and maximizing the SER of the leaked
confidential messages to the eavesdropper. Consequently, it
attains much better overall security performance than the
ZF and MMSE designs. Specifically, the simulation results
demonstrate the following:
1) In terms of security-level of confidential messages, our
solution significantly outperforms the MMSE TPC, and
the security-level performance of our design is much
closer to that of the ZF TPC, which is known to always
guarantee the maximum security-level. Our results also
show that for sufficiently high SNRs, our MSER TPC
attains the maximum security-level too, which means no
leakage of confidential messages at all for high SNRs.
2) In terms of SER of confidential messages, as expected,
our MSER design significantly outperforms the MMSE
design. The SER of confidential messages for the ZF
design is considerably worse than that of the MMSE
design. This is because the SER of confidential messages
is scarified by the ZF design in pursuit zero leakage of
confidential messages. By contrast, our design strikes a
flexible balance between the SER and the leakage of
confidential messages.
3) In terms of overall security performance, i.e., secure-
DCMC-capacity, it is well known that the MMSE TPC
outperforms the ZF TPC, since the former does attempt
to strike a trade-off between the SER and the leakage of
confidential messages. Not surprisingly, our MSER TPC
attains significantly higher secure-DCMC-capacity than
the MMSE design. This confirms that our design strikes
an optimal trade-off between the SER and the leakage of
confidential messages, and it is capable of providing the
highest overall security performance.




















)∣∣s1(nr1),W ) d yR1(nr1)=2P (nr1 ,z1)E,R1 (W ). (44)
very favourable, because this three-antenna user has a weak
potential eavesdropper – user 1 having only one antenna.
Therefore, for each of the MSER and MMSE designs, the
achievable security-level of user 2 is much higher than that of
user 1. Since the equivalent MIMO system for user 2 is a two-
input three-output system, the SERs of confidential messages
for the three designs are typically similar. More specifically,
1) In terms of security-level of confidential messages, again
the MSER-based design is closer to the ZF-based design,
and it is better than the MMSE-based design.
2) In terms of SER of confidential messages, the three
designs typically achieve similar performance, especially
when there exists no antenna correlation. By contrast, for
high antenna correlation, the performance of the ZF-based
solution becomes inferior to those of the MMSE-based
and MSER-based solutions.
3) In terms of secure-DCMC-capacity, the MMSE-based and
MSER-based solutions are typically very close, and they
considerably outperform the ZF-based TPC.
As the ZF TPC completely removes the leakage of confi-
dential messages, its security-level is independent of both the
Rician factor KRice and antenna correlation ρ for both users.
But its SER of confidential messages and secure-DCMC-
capacity are very sensitive to KRice and ρ. Typically, for the
ZF TPC, the SER performance of legitimate user achievable
under the Rayleigh channel (KRice = 0) is considerably
worse than under the Rician channel (KRice = 10 and 20).
Moreover, a higher ρ significantly degrades the achievable
secure-DCMC-capacity of the ZF solution. For the MMSE
and MSER solutions, the achievable security-level, SER of
confidential messages and secure-DCMC-capacity are better
under the Rician channel (KRice = 10 and 20) than under
the Raleigh channel (KRice = 0). Furthermore, increasing ρ
typically degrades the achievable security-level, SER of con-
fidential messages and secure-DCMC-capacity performance
for these two designs, with some exceptions to the SER and
secure-DCMC-capacity of the MSER-based design under low-
SNR conditions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the physical layer security
for a generic non-orthogonal based MIMO broadcast system
from the radically new SER perspective, rather than from
the classical ergodic capacity view of information theory. In
particular, we have proposed a new priority-aware secure TPC
design based on the multi-objective SER optimization, which
is capable of striking a flexible trade-off between minimizing
the SER of the legitimate user and maximizing the SER
of the confidential messages leaked to the eavesdropper. To
add the evaluation of various TPC based PHYS solutions
for MIMO, we have introduced three metrics, namely, the
security-level of confidential messages, which quantifies how
secure the confidential messages remain in the presence of an
eavesdropper, the standard SER of confidential messages, and
the new secure-DCMC-capacity, which takes into account both
the security-level and SER of confidential messages and, there-
fore, it quantifies the overall security performance. Our de-
tailed analysis together with extensive simulation results have
demonstrated that our proposed priority-aware MSER-based
TPC outperforms the existing secure TPC designs, such as
the ZF-based and MMSE-based solutions. More specifically, in
terms of delivering confidential messages at a low SER, while
maintaining a high security-level of confidential messages,
our proposed priority-aware MSER-based TPC design has
been shown to be very effective, particularly in a challenging
scenario of our specific example where the eavesdropper is
equipped with three receive antennas, while the legitimate user
only has a single one.
APPENDIX
A. The average legitimate-user CSEP of user 1’s confidential
messages
By exploiting the shift symmetric property of the CPDF of




6= zm, for 2 ≤
m ≤
√
M − 1, can be expressed as (44).
























All the legitimate constellation symbols in the M -QAM set S
can be assumed to be equiprobable, and the average legitimate-

















































































































































≈ 2P (nr1 )E,R1 (W ). (49)
By average P (nr1 )E,1 (W ) over 1 ≤ nr1 ≤ Nr1 as well as noting
(46), the average legitimate-user CSEP of user 1 is readily
derived in (18).
B. The illegitimate-CSEP of user 2 eavesdropping on user 1’s
confidential messages




6= zm, 2 ≤ m ≤√























Because all the symbols in the M -QAM set S are equiprob-
able, the average illegitimate-CSEP of user 2 eavesdropping



















Since the square M -QAM constellation is symmet-
ric between the real-part and imaginary-part, the average


































can be expressed as
P
(nr1 )




Then by averaging over 1 ≤ nr1 ≤ Nr1 , the average
illegitimate-CSEP of user-2 eavesdropping on user-1’s con-
fidential messages, P ill(1)E,2 (W ), is readily given in (27).
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